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to Colo. S.Ct. (Erickson et~~ 
Rovira, Quinn [dissenting]) 
v. 
BERTINE (had evidence excluded) State/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr contends that a routine inventory search 
of closed containers in an automobile does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Resp was stopped by an 
officer of the Boulder Police Department for speeding and weaving 
in traffic. He was driving a 1957 panel truck at the time. 
After he was stopped, he was given a roadside sobriety test and 




arresting officer radioed for another officer to come and impound 
the truck. Resp was not asked for his permission for the 
impoundment or his wishes as to what else should be done with the 
truck. Another officer arrived and inventoried the contents of 
the truck pursuant to the impound. On the floor behind the front 
bench seat of the truck, the inventorying officer found a 
backpack. He opened the backpack and found a tan zippered nylon 
bag containing several hard objects. He opened the zippered bag 
and found four closed metal containers. He opened each of these 
containers and discovered several grams of cocaine, some cocaine-
related paraphernalia, and $700 in cash. 
Resp was charged with DWI and with possession of cocaine 
with intent to sell and distribute. On his motion to suppress 
the cocaine-related evidence, the state trial court held that the 
state constitution barred the search and thus excluded the 
evidence. The trial court did not reach petr's Fourth Amendment 
claim. Petr appealed. The Colo. s.ct. affirmed but based its 
decision on the Fourth Amendment rather than on the state 
constitution. 
The majority rejected petr's contention that the case was 
governed by Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 u.s. 640 (1983), in which 
this Court held that an inventory search of containers found on 
the person of someone about to be incarcerated was 
constitutionally permissible. Distinguishing this car impound 
case from the preincarceration situation in Lafayette, the Colo. 
S.Ct. held that the balancing test of South Dakota v. Opperman, 
428 U.S. 364 (1976), should be applied to determine whether 
-3-
containers could be opened and searched during the inventory of a 
car. 
Applying this test, the Colo. S.Ct. found that the interests 
justifying such a search were much stronger in the 
preincarceration context than in the automobile impound context 
and declined to extend Lafayette's holding to this case. In 
reaching this conclusion, the Colo. S.Ct. relied on its decision 
in People v. Counterman, 556 P .2d 481 (1976), in which it had 
held that an inventory search of a closed knapsack found in an 
impounded vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment. This holding 
was based on the court's conclusion that the strong privacy 
interests in the knapsack outweighed the relatively weak 
governmental interests in inventorying the contents of the 
knapsack. 
The Colo. S.Ct. also held that the governmental interests in 
this particular case did not render the search of the backpack 
reasonable: The impound lot was very secure, resp was available, 
and the search involved an intrusion into a container (the 
backpack) that was obviously intended as a respository for 
personal effects. Nor was there any indication that there were 
any dangerous or contraband objects present. The Colo. s.ct. 
also rejected petr's argument that the search was permissible 
simply because it occurred pursuant to the police department's 
guidelines. In a footnote, the Colo. S.Ct. discussed New York v. 
Belton, 453 u.s. 454 (1981), and the rationale behind allowing a 
full search of the passenger compartment in that context. The 
-
-4-
court contrasted those purposes with the interests supporting an 
inventory search. 
The dissent disagreed. Basically, the dissent argued that 
Lafayette controlled. The dissent also contended that Belton was 
germane to this case because there the Court indicated its 
willingness to elevate law enforcement concerns over the 
individual's expectation of privacy in containers found in a car. 
The interests found in Belton are similar to those found here. In 
fact, the Court specifically recognized them in Opperman. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr reasserts the arguments made by the 
dissent below: Lafayette and Opperman control. The Colo. S.Ct. 
incorrectly held that the governmental interest in the 
preincarceration context was greater than the governmental 
interest in the inventory context. This supposition is 
diametrically opposed to the holding in Opperman, where the Court 
upheld the governmental interest in such searches. The 
underlying interests are exactly the same as the Court recited in 
Opperman: ( 1) safekeeping of valuable property; ( 2) protect ion of 
the police from claims of false theft; and (3) protection of the 
police and the public from dangerous instrumentalities. The only 
additional interest in Lafayette was that the inspection of 
containers might help the police in determining the identity of 
the arrestee. The Opperman interests appiy equally here. 
Petr also asserts that the decision below conflicts with 
decisions in other courts. Petr asserts that other state courts 
have upheld inventory searches of closed containers found in 
cars. See, e.g., State v. Glenn, 649 S.W.2d 584, 587, 588 (Tenn. 
-5-
1983) (collecting cases). Further, there is a split in the 
circuits. Three circuits have upheld such searches. See United 
States v. Griffin, 729 F.2d 475 (CA7 1984), cert. denied, 105 
S.Ct. 117 (1984); United States v. Laing, 708 F.2d 1568 (CAll), 
cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 246 (1983); United States v. Markland, 
635 F.2d 174 (CA2 1980). One circuit has gone the other way. 
See United States v. Bloomfield, 594 F.2d 1200 (1979). 
4. DISCUSSION: The question of whether closed containers 
found in a car may be opened and searched during an inventory of 
the car is one that this Court has not yet addressed 
specifically. And it appears that, at least before Lafayette, 
there was both a split among the states and a split in the 
circuits on this question. See, e.g., Laing, supra, and 
Bloomfield, supra. Because Lafayette does not, I think, actually 
control this type of case I would think that this variance might 
present a certworthy question. 
One problem with some of these cases, however, is 
demonstrated by this case. That problem is the overlap of the 
impound cases with Belton. Although the Colo. s.ct. discussed 
Belton generally, it did not seem to recognize that Belton might 
control this case. That is, resp here was arrested in a full 
custodial arrest. Under these circumstances, Belton would seem 
to authorize the search of any closed container found within the 
passenger compartment as part of a search incident to the arrest. 
(The description of where the backpack in this case was found 
would seem to me to be within the passenger compartment.) Since 
Belton, however, at least some courts have relied on the impound 
t 
-6-
search to authorize the search of containers in the passenger 
compartment where there was a full custodial arrest instead of 
Belton. See, e.g., Griffin, supra. 
Thus, there seems to be a little confusion as to the 
relationship between impound searches and Belton. Although in 
some cases this confusion would not affect a court's decision 
whether to exclude evidence, in a few it might. In this case, 
for example, if the court treats impound searches of containers 
as prohibited then there would be a different result if Belton 
were applied to containers found in the passenger compartment. 
Further, containers found in a trunk might be subject to search 
under an impound search and not under Belton. 
As to the certworthiness of this case, I'm not sure that the 
Court would want to grant cert if it will end up only reaffirming 
Belton. On the other hand, since the parties are arguing only 
the impound question, that question would seem to be properly 
presented. The issues here are confused since no one is talking 
about Belton's possible relevance, and it might be better to wait 
for a trunk case where the Belton issue was irrelevant and the 
impound issue presented in isolation. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: If the Court wants to pursue this case 
further, a CFR would be appropriate as there is no response. It 
also might be appropriate to CFRec to nail down the question of 
whether this was in the passenger compartment or not. 
There is no response. 
January 28, 1986 Strand Opinion in petn 
t, 1 t. 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: February 4, 1986 
RE: Colorado v. Bertine, No. 85-889 
Cert petition 
Resp in this case was arrested for driving under -5 
the influence of alcohol; while he was still on the scene, 
police impounded and searched resp 's truck. They found 
cocaine in a closed container, inside a knapsack that was ""___ __ --
in t he truck's passenger compartment. The Colorado 
Supreme Court held that the search violated the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The decision~onflicts with New York v. Belton, 453 
u.s. 454 (1981). Under Bel ton, the police were free to 
search the truck's passenger compartment as part of their 
search incident to respondent's arrest. That resolves 
this case. Thus, this case doesn't really present the 
issue tha't petr ·is argui~ about: whether a warrantless 
inventory search of a car's contents is permissible under 
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 u.s. 640 (1983) and South 
2. 
Dakota v. Opperman 428 U.s. 364 ( 1976) . 1 Since there is 
nothing certworthy in applying Belton to the facts of this 
~
case, I recommend that the Court treat this as an isolated 
state court error and deny cert. 
-- -~-- ---------
lrn Opperman, you wrote a concurring opinion expressing 
the view that warrantless inventory searches of 
automobiles are~ermissible. See --opperman, 428 u.s., at 
383-384 (POWELL, J., concurring). That opinion made sense 
I 
then, and no intervening developments suggest that your 
view should be different now. The problem here is that 
the inventory-search issue can be reached only by ignoring 
a much clearer (and wholly uncertworthy) ground for 
reversal: Belton. 
Court ................... . 
March 21, 1986 
·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . 
Submitted ................ , 19 .. . 





Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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Brennan, J ................... . 
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v 
Stevens, J ..................... / ... . 
O'Connor, J .......................... . 
No. 85-889 
ABSENT NOT YOTING 
October 2, 1986 
COLORADO GINA-POW 
85-889 COLORADO v. BERTINE (Supreme Court of Colorado 
November Arguments 
MEMO TO FILE: 
This is another "automobile search" case. Although I 
thought the Supreme Court of Colorado erred, I voted to 
deny because our prior cases have established the relevant 
principles. The Colorado Court largely ignored two 
relevant decisions, even though the dissenting opinion 
relied on them. In my view, this case is probably 
controlled by New York v. Belton, 453 u.s. 454, and U.S. --
v. Ross, 456 u.s. 798. Our decision, particularly my 
concurring opinion, in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 u.s. 
364 (sustaining the validity of "inventory searches"), 
also is relevant. Indeed, the SG' s amicus brief relies 
primarily on Opperman. 
In briefest summary, respondent was arrested for 
drunk driving. He was too drunk to continue to drive, and 
under established police regulations respondent's truck 
was impounded. A second officer had arrived on the scene, 
and - again in accord with regulations - they conducted a 
2. 
search of the inside of the vehicle where they opened a 
knapsack and found contraband. 
Although I believe the rationale of Belton probably 
controls, respondent argues that the police had probable 
cause to search in Belton and did not have it in this 
case. Respondent distinguishes Ross by a similar 
argument. My recollection is that neither Belton nor Ross 
conditioned the right to search incident to arrest to the 
existence of probable cause. The justification for the 
search was a right incident to "arrest". See Robinson. 
It will be argued in this case that respondent was 
out of the vehicle and therefore could not have reached a 
weapon or concealed a contraband. These were points 
mentioned, as I recall, in Bel ton. I am not persuaded, 
however, that we should try to draw a line - a fine one-
between whether the party lawfully arrested was in or out 
of the vehicle. 
Apparently the SG thinks the stronger argument for 
the state in this case is the "inventory search" doctrine 
of South Dakota v. Opperman. I could decide the case on 
that basis, and without having reread my concurring 
opinion - believe that what I wrote would be consistent. 
I would prefer, if this can be done in a principled 
3. 
manner, to hold that the rationale of Belton applies. The 
Colorado Supreme Court relied heavily on Chadwick and my 
opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders. I believe both of these 
cases are clearly distinguishable, as the dissenting 
opinion by two Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court 
concluded. 
Although I am familiar with this area, I would like a 
summary bench memo from my clerk. Respondent argues that 
in Bel ton, Ross and Opperman, the pol ice had no 
"discretion" as they conducted searches incident to arrest 
or for inventory purposes in accord with regulations. In 
this case, however, respondent says the police had 
discretion. Even if this is correct, so long as the 
regulations authorized an inventory search of an impounded 





To: Mr. Justice Powell October 9, 1986 
From: Andy 
Re: State of Colorado v. Bertine, No. 85-889 
Oral Argument: Wednesday, November 5, 1986 
Cert to the Colorado s. Ct. 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
The question presented is whether the 4th amendment prohib-
its the police from opening a closed container found inside an 
automobile during a routine inventory search. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Early one morning a member of the Boulder, Colorado, police 
force saw resp' s van weaving through traffic at an excessive 
speed. After pulling the van over into a "no parking" zone, the 
officer noticed that resp's eyes were glassy and his speech was 
slurred. The policeman conducted a series of sobriety tests, and 
then arrested resp for drivin while intoxicated. Resp was hand-
cuffed and placed in the patrol car. 
By this time a backup policeman, Officer Reichenback, had 
arrived on the scene. The arresting officer asked Reichenback to 
im~an, as permitted by city ordinance.l Reichenback 
called a tow truck, and at that point resp was taken to the po-
lice station. 
Before the tow truck arrived, Reichenback conducted an in-
ventory of the items inside the van. The Boulder police depart-
ment directives specify that when a vehicle has been used in the 
commission of a crime, the police should rna e a "detailed vehicle 
inspection and inventor , " and should remove personal i terns of 
value to be kept in police custody for safekeeping. See Cert 
Petn at 52 n. 2. The officer is required to record the results 
of the inventory on a standardized vehicle impound form. 
During his search, Reichenback discovered a closed backpack 
behind the driver's seat. The officer unzipped the main compart-
1 The Boulder Rev. Code provides that a police officer may have 
any car removed from the street when the driver has been taken 
into custody, or when the car is blocking traffic. §§7-7-
2(a)(4), (a)(l) (1981). 
ment and removed a sealed nylon bag. 
tin cans which had been clipped shut. 
..). 
Inside the bag were four -
The officer opened the 
cans and found drug paraphernalia, cocaine, and $700 cash. Resp 
subsequently was charged with illegal possession of narcotics. 
Resp moved to suppress the evidence on a variety of grounds, 
most of which were rejected by the tc. The court ruled, for ex-
ample, that the police had complied with department guidelines 
when carrying out the search. The tc rejected the claim that 
Reichenback had searched the van in bad faith, finding specifi-
cally that the inventory was not a pretext for an investigatory 
search. The court also ruled that the search did not violated 
/ 
the u.s. Constitution, in light of this Court's decision in Illi-
nois v. Lafayette, 462 u.s. 640 (1983) (pre-incarceration inven-
tory search of shoulder bag permissible). The trial judge held, 
however, that the evidence must be suppressed because the search 
violated the Colorado Constitution. See Colo. Const. Art. II §7 
(similar language to 4th amendment). 
~ 
The state took an interlocutory appeal, and the Colo. S. Ct. ~~~? - tf1A.? 
affirmed. Significantly, the court based its decision on federal ~ 
rather than state constitutional grounds. The state court ac-~ 
knowledged that warrantless inventory searches of automobiles 
were permissible, citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 u.s. 364 
..J • .J J 
(1976). The court noted, however, that Opperman did not involve ~
 
the search of closed containers found inside the car, and thus ~~ 
did not address the permissible scope of an inventory search. ~ 
The relevant precedent on this question, said the state court,~~ 
are Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (invalidating war-
'We 
rantless search of luggage seized from car), and United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (same). Based on these two deci-
sions, the Colo. court found that resp had a high expectation of 
privacy in the closed backpack, and that this interest outweighed 
the government's interest in making an inventory of the pack's 
contents. Consequently, the court agreed that the evidence 
should be suppressed as the product of an unreasonable search. 
The state court also emphasized the the search was invalid 
because there were less invasive alternatives available to the 
pol ice: ( 1) they could have left the backpack in the van, and 
impounded the vehicle and its contents as a single unit, thereby 
obviating the need for an inventory; C2) they could have removed 
the backpack and stored it as a single unit, since there was no 
reason to believe that the pack contained valuables or dangerous 
devices; (3) they could have asked resp what he wanted done with 
his van, and whether he wanted its contents stored separately. 
See Petn App 44-48; SG Brief at 5. Curiously, the court further 
suggested that some containers carried a higher expectation of 
privacy than others: "even assuming that the officer acted rea-
sonably in opening either the backpack or the sealed nylon bag, 
little justification existed for further intrusion into the 
'1 ~ L-- .A-_.-.AJ 
sealed cans." Id., at 48. ~)~~t~~/J../~r 
The Colo. · stinguished this Court's ruling in La-
fayette, supra, held that the right to conduct a pre-
incarceration inventory search included the right to examine the 
contents of defendant's shoulder bag. The state court limited -- ----..-----
~ that decision to its facts, finding that the state had a particu-
lar interest in making sure that weapons and contraband were not 
carried into jail cells. That concern was not present in automo-
bile inventories, said the court, and thus the state's interest 
in opening the backpack must give was to resp' s expectation of 
privacy. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Grounds For The Decision 
There are several opinions of this Court that bear on the 
question presented, although none are decisive. In your Memo to 
File, you stated a preference for resolving this case on the 
basis of the legal principles set forth in United States v. Ross, 
456 u.s. 798 (1982), and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
I am not convinced that either case is controlling, however, be-
cause each is factually and doctrinally distinguishable. 
I~ the defendant was arrested for selling drugs out of 
the trunk of his car. After the car was impounded, an investiga-
tive search of the trunk revealed two closed bags. The police 
opened the bags and found contraband. This Court upheld the 
search, finding that the "automobile exception" to the warrant 
clause allows the police to search every part of the vehicle, 
including sealed containers found within. 
Similarly in~ the police arrested the driver and pas-
sengers of a car on suspicion of marihuana possession. After the 
suspects were removed from the vehicle, the officer conducted a 
"search incident" to the arrest. The policeman removed a jacket 
~ from the back sear and found drugs in one of the pockets. The 
o. 
Court again upheld the search, holding that during a search inci-
dent, the police may check the contents of any container found 
within the passenger compartment. 
While there is relevant language and reasoning in each of ~ 
these decisions, it would be difficult to justify the search of ~ 




Although the Colo. police had probable cause to ar-
l < 
there is no evidence that they had probable cause to 
search his van as well. Cf. Ross, 456 U.S., at 808-809 (automo-
bile exception requires probable cause to believe that car con- ~ ~ 
rt....-....r 
tains fruits of a crime). It also seems clear that the search ~
If ~ 
was not "incident" to the arrest, since resp had been taken to
"-\ 
the police station before the inventory began. It is true that ~ 
c~ 
this exception does not turn on the suspect's ability to reach 
the container in question at the time of the search: in Belton 
the defendants were standing away from the car, and could not 
have reached for the evidence or a weapon. Nevertheless, I do 
not think that a search incident ever has been extended to a case 
where the defendant is literally miles away from the vehicle. 
This would be a troubling and unnecessary extension of the doc-
trine. 
The most reasoned basis on which to decide this case is the 
'inventory search" exception to the warrant requirement. This 
Court has ruled that the police may conduct a routine, standard-
ized inventory of the contents of a seized vehicle, even if there 
is no probable cause for the search. South Dakota v. Opperman, 
428 U.S. 364 (1976). Emphasizing the "caretaking" duties of the 
I • 
police and the lack of discretion held by the searching officer, 
the Court held that such an search is not "unreasonable" within 
the meaning of the 4th amendment. The state's right to conduct 
an inventory is justified by three administrative concerns(£1he 
-...... 
need to protect the suspect's property~e · need to protect the 
police from fraudulent claims of theft: an~e need to ensure 
that the seized property does not contain dangerous devices. 
Id., at 369. 
Accordingly, the Court must address two issues raised by 
resp in support of the decision below: (1) did the police in this 
case conduct a valid inventory search? (2) if yes, does the right 
to inventory the contents of a vehicle include the right to open 
sealed containers? 
B. Was This an Inventory Search? 
Resp argues that the search of his van is distinguishable 
from the inventory approved in Opperman, because here the police 
had unlimited discretion in deciding which drivers to subject to 
a search. Under department regulations, the police have three 
' 
options when a car ' is seized. ~, they may have the vehicle 
impou~d and its contents inve \ toried, as was done here. Sec-
ond,~ ey may drive the car to a public parking lot, lock it, and 
leave it for the suspect to pick up when he is released. Final-
ly, '}~y may allow the suspect to call a third party, who then 
becomes responsible for the vehicle. The choice is left strictly --------
to the arresting officer. Resp argues that this discretion 
distinguishes the case from Opperman, where the police apparently 
were required to inventory every car. Cf. id., at 383 (Powell, 
8. 
J., concurring) (in an inventory search, "[t]he officer does not 
make a discretionary determination to search based on a judgment 
that certain conditions are present."). Unless the search is 
required by regulation in each case, argues resp, the Opperman 
rationale does not apply. 
This argument raises a potentially troubling issue, but the 
facts are not quite as egregious as resp suggests. While it is 
true that the police had discretion whether to search, there was 
no discretion concerning the scope of the inventory once the de-
cision is made. If the police elect to take responsibility for 
the contents of a vehicle, they are required to fill out a stan-
dardized form, listing all personal items that are to be removed 
and stored elsewhere. The procedure is routine, and does not 
call on the officer to exercise any judgment. 
Resp's argument would be more persuasive if there was evi-
dence below showing that the police made its decisions to impound 
on the basis of non-administrative concerns {e.g., the appearance 
or age of the driver), thus raising the inference that the "in-
ventory" was a pretext for an investigative search. But the evi-
dence in this case is to the contrary; the tc found that the 
search was conducted in aith, and that it was not a pretext 
to search for evidence of criminal activity. Given this, and 
given that the officer apparently followed well-established pro-
cedure at all times, it seems clear that on these facts the po- J 
lice conducted a legitimate inventory search within the meaning 
of Opperman. 
9. 
C. The Scope of the Search. 
The only S. Ct. case to discuss the scope of an inventory 
search is Illinois v. Lafayette, supra, where the Court held that 
a pre-incarceration search could include any article or i tern, 
sealed or unsealed, in the suspect's possession. The SG argues 
that Lafayette is controlling, because the interests at stake in 
this case are identical: resp' s privacy interest in a backpack 
is the same as a suspect's interest in his shoulder bag, since 
both are used to store personal and valuable items. The state's 
interest in conducting the inventory also is identical to that 
found in Lafayette. The need to protect valuables, guard against 
--=; 
false claims of theft, and uncover explosives is equally compel-
ling in an automobile inventory as in a pre-incarceration search. 
The SG claims that the different factual setting of the Lafayette 
search is not substantial enough to justify limiting that case to 
its facts. See SG Brief at 17. 
The Colo. S. Ct. rejected a similar argument below and found 
Lafayette "inapplicable" to the inventory of a car. Resp agrees, 
arguing that Lafayette is distinguishable because the state's 
interest is not identical: there is an unusually high interest in 
ensuring that suspects do not carry contraband or weapons into 
the jail cells. Resp asserts that there is no similar state in-
terest in discovering the contents of an impounded car, and that 
therefore Lafayette has no precedential effect on this case. 
Resp argues that the state's lower interest therefore must give 











The state court and resp correctly point out that Lafayette 
~ 
is not decisive precedent for automobile inventories, given the ~ 
extremely high state interest in pre-incarceration searches. 
Nevertheless, liafayette r: mains strong author i ~ for permitting 
the police to open sealed containers in other inventory cases. 
First, simply because the state has a lower interest in knowing 
the contents of a van does not mean that this interest is insig-
nificant. See Opperman, supra, 428 u.s., at 379 (Powell, J. con-
curring}. It thus does not follow a fortiori that resp's inter-
est must prevail. 
More importantly, there is no indication that the Lafayette -
majority intended to restrict that decision to certain types of 
searches. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary -- the prima-
ry justification for allowing the search of containers in that 
case was the "administrative" concerns (protect the property and 
the police}, not the concern that contraband be kept out of jail 
cells. See 462 u.s., at 646. It also is interesting to note 
that in Lafayette, the Court stated that its decision was "amply 
support [ed]" by Opperman, even though the state's interest was 
the same there as it is in 
The decisions i~ 
sion below was erroneous. 
the current case. 
an~ a!§o s~t that the ~i­
As mentioned, these two decisions ad-
dress separate 4th amendment doctrines, but there is a unifying 
theme to these cases: once the police are legitimately inside the ---car, they should be permitted to take whatever reasonable steps 
are necessary to carry out their task. See, e.g., Ross, 789 
u.s., at 821 ("When a legitimate search is under way, and when 
11. 
its purpose and its limits have been precisely defined, nice dis-
tinctions between glove compartments, upholstered seats, 
trunks, and wrapped packages •.• must give way to the prompt and 
efficient completion of the task at hand.") • The SG and petr 
persuasively argue that the only way to fulfill the goals of an ~ 
inventory search -- list i terns of value and uncover dangerous 
devices -- is to open and examine sealed containers. 
The principles derived from these decisions convince me that 
the police did not violate the 4th amendment in opening resp' s 
backpack. Despite the inferences of precedent, however, resp 
maintains that the decision below correctly interpreted the 4th 
amendment as placing two limitations on the scope of an inventory 
search. Neither of these restrictions stands up to careful scru-
tiny. 
First, the state court ruled that the search of closed con-
tainers is not essential to an effective inventory, and thus is 
unsupported by Opperman rationale. Resp argues that if the con-
tainers are never opened, there is less risk of theft and less 
risk of false claims of theft, since the police will have no oc-
casion to handle the property. See Opperman, supra, 428 u.s., at 
391 n. 10 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (best way to deter false 
claims may be to seal car with all property inside). Also, it is 
not clear that the police are better protected from explosives by 
routinely opening containers than they are in simply storing them 
as a unit. See Resp Brief at 31-32. Resp therefore would impose 
a "single unit" limitation on the scope of an inventory: if the 
police find a sealed container that may be inventoried and stored 
12. 
as a unit, they must do so rather than opening and examining the 
contents. 
The core of this 
ternatives available 
./-., ~ 
claim is that there are less intrusive al-
'\ 
that will allow the state to meet its goals 
without invading the suspect's privacy interest. But while the 
argument may be descriptively accurate, it already has been re-
jected by this Court. In Lafayette, the defendant asserted that 
his shoulder bag should have been secured and stored as a unit, 
rather than having the contents inventoried. The Court held that 
there was no requirement that the police adopt the least restric-
tive alternative, noting: "We are hardly in a position to second-
guess police departments as to what practical administrative 
method will best deter theft by and false claims against its em-
ployees and preserve the security of the station house." 462 
U.S., at 648: see also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 u.s. 433, 447 
(1973) (rejecting "least restrictive means" requirement). 
Resp's second proposed limitation would require the police 
to take into account the privacy interests that attach to certain 
types of containers, particularly luggage. ---- Resp argues that Sanders, supra, and Chadwick, supra, establish that luggage and 
other personal containers do not lose their 4th amendment protec-
tion simply because they are discovered in a car. These deci-
sions also hold that there is a much higher privacy interest in 
luggage than in the car itself, thereby suggesting that the two 
should be treated differently. Resp thus concludes that the po-
lice should be barred from opening this type of personal contain-
13. 
er, unless there is some reason to believe that the luggage Cor 
backpack) contains valuable or dangerous items. 
This argument should be rejected. First, neither Chadwick 
nor Sanders involved an inventory search, making the applicabil-
ity of these cases tenuous at best. In Chadwick, in fact, the 
majority noted that its decision had no bearing on the availabil-
ity of "other justifications for a warrantless search of luggage 
taken from a suspect at the time of his arrest." 433 u.s., at 15 
n. 9. Second, it appears that the Lafayette defendant also ar-
gued that these two cases implicitly limit the scope of an inven-
tory search. See 462 u.s., at 643-644. The Court necessarily 
rejected this argument, although it did not do so explicitly. 
More importantly, the argument advanced by resp and the 
Colo. court would require the police to conduct a "container by 
container" analysis during the inventory. Under this limitation 
the officers would have to distinguish between "personal" and 
"non personal" containers, between those containers that the po-
lice have reason to believe contain valuables or explosives, and 
those that give no indication of their contents. 
Needless to say, this principle is unsupported by either law 
or logic. Both Ross and Lafayette have rejected this position, 
ruling that it would be unreasonable to expect the police to make 
"fine and subtle" distinctions between items that may be searched 
and items that must be stored as a unit. See 456 u.s., at 822 
("a constitutional distinction between "worthy" and "unworthy" 
containers would be improper."). Resp's proposal also conflicts 
with the usual understanding of the policeman's role in an inven-
14. 
tory search, namely that an officer does not h~ve discretion in 
deciding what to search and why. Finally, if the police are re-
quired to distinguish among containers, the Court arguably will 
have failed to provide "specific guidance to police and courts in 
this recurring situation." Belton, supra, 456 u.s., at 826 (Pow-
ell, J. concurring) (citation omitted). 
D. Other Issues 
brief mention: . .,...:> ~ ~ .. 
/( ~ C-eN-~ 
Two other issues that require 
1. Decision below was based on state law. Resp suggests 
that, although the Colo. S. Ct. analyzed this case in terms of 
the 4th amendment, in fact the court simply affirmed the trial 
judge's decision to suppress the evidence under the state consti-
tution. See Resp Brief at 3-4. There is no merit to this con-___. 
tent ion. The state court makes it clear that its opinion was 
based on federal constitutional law. See Cert Petn App. 50-51 
("Because we view the search here as violative of fourth amend-
ment protections, we need not decide whether [the state] Consti-
tution provides ••• greater protections."). 
2. Should have asked resp his preference. Both amici and 
resp vehemently argue that the police were obligated to ask resp ~ 
his preference of how he wanted his van disposed of after the ~ 
 I hope resp does not spend much time on this point at ~ arrest. 
oral argument. Even if the the argument had merit in general, it~ 
does not apply to this case. he police under-
standably would have been their legal 
responsibility as caretaker of the van based solely on the pref-
erence of an intoxicated suspect. 
... J. 
III. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION 
The outcome of this case is strongly suggested by this 
Court's prior decisions. There is no doubt that the police had 
the right to inventory the contents of the van, and that in this 
case the search was properly conducted. Although the police had 
discretion whether to impound the vehicle, once the decision was 
made the officers followed established policy in opening the 
backpack and examining the contents. 
Resp's attempts to limit the scope of inventory searches are 
unpersuasive. Despite the legitimate privacy interest in closed 
containers, Lafayette rejected the notion that this interest is 
sufficient to overcome the state's interest in protecting sus-
pects, the property, and the police. There also is no merit to 
the suggestion that the police should be able to open containers 
only when they appear to contain valuables or dangerous devices. 
An inventory search should be routine and non-discretionary to 
the extent possible, a goal that is inconsistent with the re-
quirement that the police draw subtle distinctions. 
I recommend that the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court 
be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
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From: The Chief Justice 
Circulated: I 2/ I /l?G? 
Recirculated: _______ _ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-889 
COLORADO, PETITIONER v. STEVEN LEE BERTINE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
COLORADO 
[December -, 1986] 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
On February 10, 1984, a police officer in Boulder, Colorado 
arrested petitioner Steven Lee Bertine for driving while 
under the influence of alcohol. After Bertine was taken into 
custody and before the arrival of a tow truck to take Bertine's 
van to an impoundment lot, 1 a backup officer inventoried the 
contents of the van. The officer opened a closed backpack in 
which he found controlled substances, cocaine paraphernalia, 
and a large amount of cash. Bertine was subsequently 
charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol, un-
lawful possession of cocaine with intent to dispense, sell, and 
distribute, and unlawful possession of methaqualone. We 
are asked to decide whether the Fourth Amendment prohib-
its the State from proving these charges with the evidence 
discovered during the inventory of Bertine's van. We hold 
that it does not. 
'Section 7-7-2(a)(4) of the Boulder Rev. Code authorizes police officers 
to impound vehicles when drivers are taken into custody. Section 
7-7-2(a)(4) provides: 
"A peace officer is authorized to remove or cause to be removed a vehicle 
from any street, parking lot, or driveway when: 
(4) The driver of the vehicle is taken into custody by the police depart-
ment." Boulder Rev. Code § 7-7-2(a)(4)(1981). 
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The backup officer inventoried the van in accordance with 
local police procedures, which require a detailed inspection 
and inventory of impounded vehicles. He found the back-
pack directly behind the front seat of the van. Inside the 
pack, the officer observed a nylon bag containing metal canis-
ters. Openin the canisters, the officer discovered that they 
contained respective c aine, methaqualone tablets, co-
caine paraphernalia, and $700 dollars in cash. In an outside 
zippered pouch of the backpack, he also found $210 dollars in 
cash in a sealed envelope. After completing the inventory of 
the van, the officer had the van towed to an impound lot and 
brought the backpack, money, and contraband to the police 
station. 
After Bertine was charged with the offenses described 
above, he moved to suppress the evidence found during the 
inventory search on the ground, inter alia, that the search of 
the closed backpack and containers exceeded the permissible 
scope of such a search under the Fourth Amendment. The 
Colorado trial court ruled that probable cause supported 
Bertine's arrest and that the police officers had made the de-
cisions to impound the vehicle and to conduct a thorough in-
ventory search in good faith. Although noting that the in-
ventory of the vehicle was performed in a "somewhat slip-
shod" manner, the District Court concluded that "the search 
of the backpack was done for the purpose of protecting the 
owner's property, protection of the police from subsequent 
claims of loss or stolen property, and the protection of the po-
lice from dangerous instrumentalities." Joint app. 81-83. 
The court observed that the standard procedures for im-
pounding vehicles mandated "the opening of containers and 
the listing of [their] contents." I d., at 81. Based on these 
findings, the court determined that the inventory search did 
not violate Bertine's rights under Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. !d., at 83. The court, never-
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theless, granted Bertine's motion to suppress, holding that 
the inventory search violated the Colorado Constitution. 
On the State's interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Colorado affirmed. People v. Bertine, 706 P. 2d 411 (Colo. 
1985). In contrast to the District Court, however, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court premised its ruling on the United States 
Constitution. The court recognized that in South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1986), we had held inventory 
searches of automobiles to be consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment, and that in Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U. S. 640 
(1983), we had held that the inventory search of personal ef-
fects of an arrestee at a police station were also permissible 
under that Amendment. The Supreme Court of Colorado 
felt, however, that our decisions in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 
U. S. 753 (1979), and United States v. Chadwick, 443 U. S. 1 
(1977), holding searches of closed trunks and suitcases to vio-
late the Fourth Amendment, meant that Opperman and La-
fayette did not govern this case. 2 
We granted certiorari to consider the important and recur-
ring question of federal law decided by the Colorado Supreme 
Court. 3 475 U. S. -- (1986). As that court recognized, 
2 Two Justices dissented from the majority opinion, arguing that South 
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976), and Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 
U. S. 640 (1983), compel the conclusion that the inventory search of the 
backpack found in Bertine's van was permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
3 Since our decision in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976), 
several courts have confronted the issue whether police may inventory the 
contents of containers found in vehicles taken into police custody. See, 
e. g., United States v. Griffin, 729 F. 2d 475 (CA7) (upholding inventory 
search of package found in paper bag), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 830 (1984); 
United States v. Bloomfield, 594 F. 2d 1200 (CA8 1979) (affirming suppres-
sion of evidence found in closed knapsack); People v. Braash, 122 Ill. App. 
3d 747, 78 Ill. Dec. 67, 461 N. E. 2d 651 (1984) (upholding inventory of pa-
per bag); People v. Gonzalez, 62 N. Y.2d 386, 477 N. Y.S. 2d 103, 465 
N. E. 2d 823 (1984) (upholding inventory of paper bag); Boggs v. Common-
wealth, 229 Va. 501, 331 S. E. 2d 407 (1985) (upholding inventory of boxes 
and pouch found in bag), cert. denied, 475 U. S.- (1986). 
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· ventory searc e are now a well-defined exception to the 
warran qmrement of ..the Fourth Amendment. See La-
fayette, supra, at 643; 'Opperman, supra, at 367-376. The 
policies behind the warrant requirement are not implicated in 
the noninvestigative context of an inventory search, 
Opperman, 428 U. S., at 370, n. 5, nor is the related concept 
of probable cause. "The standard of probable cause is pecu-
liarly related to criminal investigations, not routin~oncrim­
inal procedures." Ibid.; see also United States v. Chadwick, 
433 U. S. 1, 10; n. 5 (1977). For these reasons, the Colorado 
Supreme Court's reliance on Arkansas v. Sande~, 442 U. S. 
753 (1979), an United States v. ~ck, supra, w~or­
r~ct. Both of these cases concerned searches solely for the 
purpose of investigating criminal conduct, with the validity of 
the searches therefore dependent on the application of the 
probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment. 1 , 
The appropriate focus of in or invento searches is, 
by contrast, the reasonableness requirement of t at Amend-
ment. In Q~an, this Court assessed the reasonable-
ness of an inventory search of the glove compartment in an 
abandoned automobile impounded by the police. We found 
that inventory procedures serve to protect an owner's prop-
erty while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against 
claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard 
the police from danger. In light of these strong govern-
mental interests and the diminished expectation of privacy in 
an automobile, we upheld the search. In reaching this deci-
sion, we observed that our cases accorded deference to police 
caretaking procedures designed to secure and protect vehi-
cles and their contents within police custody. See Cooper v. 
California, 386 U. S. 58, 61-62 (1967); Harris v. United 
States, 390 U. S. 234, 236 (1968); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 
u. s. 433, 447-448 (1973). 4 
• The Colorado Supreme Court correctly stated that Opperman did not 
address the question whether the scope of an inventory search may extend 
85-889-0PINION 
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In our more recent decision, ~a police officer con-
ducted an inventory search of the contents of a shoulder bag 
in the possession o an mdiv1dua bem~dy. 
In deciding whether this search was reasonable, we recog-
nized that the search served legitimate governmental inter-
ests similar to those identified in Opperman. We deter-
mined that those interests outweighed the individual's 
Fourth Amendment interests and upheld the search. 
In the present case, as in Opperman and Lafayette, there 
was ~ who were following standard-
ized procedures, a~h Qf for the sol~ur_Eose of 
in~g9n. In addition, the governmental interests justi-
fying flle inventory searches in Opperman and Lafayette are 
nearly the same as those which obtain here. In each case, 
the police were potentially responsible for the property taken 
into their custody. By securing the property, the police pro-
tected the property from unauthorized interference. Knowl-
edge of the precise nature of the property helped guard 
against claims of theft, vandalism, or negligence. Such 
knowledge also helped to avert any danger to police or others 
that may have been posed by the property. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado opined that Lafayette was 
not controlling here because there was no danger of introduc-
ing contraband or weapons into a jail facility. Our opinion in 
Lafayette, however, did not suggest that the station-house 
setting of the inventory search was critical to our holding in 
that case. Both in the present case and in Lafayette, the ) 
common governmental interests described above were \ 
served by the inventory searches. 
to closed containers located in the interior of an impounded vehicle. We 
did note, however, that" 'when the police take custody of any sort of con-
tainer [such as] an automobile ... it is reasonable to search the container 
to itemize the property to be held by the police.'" 428 U. S., at 371 (quot-
ing United States v. Gravitt, 484 F. 2d 375, 378 (CA5 1973), cert. denied, 
414 u. s. 1135 (1974)). 
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The Supreme Court of Colorado also expressed the view 
that the search in this case was unreasonable because secure 
facilities for storing Bertine's van were available and Bertine 
himself could have been offered the opportunity to make 
other arrangements for the safekeeping of his property. 
While such a procedure would undoubtedly have been possi-
ble, we said in Lafayette: 
"[t]he real question is not what 'could have been 
achieved, ' .but whether the Fourth Amendment '[§quf:!es 
such steps . . . The reasonableness of any particular ac-
tivity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the ex-
istence of alternative 'less intrusive' means." Lafayette, 
462 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original). 
See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 447 (1973); United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 557, n. 12 (1976). 
We conclude that here, as in Lafayette, reasonable police 
regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in 
good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even though 
courts might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise 
equally reasonable rules requiring a different procedure. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado also thought it necessary 
to require that police, before inventorying a container, weigh 
the strength of the individual's privacy interest in the con-
tainer against the possibility that the container might serve 
as a repository for dangerous or valuable items. We think 
that such a requirement is contrary to our decisions in 
Opperman and Lafayette, and by analogy to our decision in 
United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982): 
"Even if less intrusive means existed of protecting some 
particular types of property, it would be unreasonable to 
expect police officers in the everyday course of business 
to make fine and subtle distinctions in deciding which 
containers or items may be searched and which must be 
sealed as a unit. " Lafayette, supra, at 648. 
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"When a legitimate search is under way, and when its 
purpose and its limits have been precisely defined, ~ 
distinctions between closets, drawers, and containers, in 
the case of a home, or between glove compartments, up-
holstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the 
case of vehicle, must "ve way to the interest in the 
prom t and efficient com letion of th task at hand." 
United States v. Ross, supra, at 821. 
We reaffirm. these principles here: "'[a] single familiar 
standard is essen a o gui e po 1ce officers, who have only 
limited time and experience to reflect on and balance the so-
cial and individual interests involved in the specific circum-
stances they confront.'" See Lafayette, 462 U. S., at 648 
(quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 458 (1981)). 
Bertine finally argues that the inventory search of his van 
was unconstitutional because departmental regulations gave 
the police officers discretion to choose between impounding 
his van and parking and locking it in a public parking place. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado did not rely on this argument 
in reaching its conclusion, and we reject it. Which of two or 
more reasonable procedures embodied in departmental regu-
lations are followed in any given case must rest primarily in 
the judgment of the officers on the scene who are familiar 
with the operation of the regulations. 
While both Opperman and Lafayette are distinguishable 
from the present case on their facts, we think that the princi-
ples enunciated in these cases govern the present one. The 
jud~ Supreme Court of Colorado is therefore 
Reversed. 
CHAMBERS Of' 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~u;trttttt Cl}onrt of t4t ~b .ibdts 
'lllas 1tinghtu. ~. <!f. 2llb1'4-c1 
December 1, 1986 
Re: No. 85-889-Colorado v. Bertine 
Dear Chief: 





The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
December 2, 1986 
85-889 Colorado v. Bertine 
Dear Chtef: 
Please join me. 
The Chi~£ Ju~tice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
CHAM!II!:RS Of" 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
.fu:prtntt <lfouri of ffrt 'Jnitt~ jlhdtg 
-.u~ ~. Of. 2ll.;i"'~ 
December 2, 1986 
No. 85-889 
Colorado v. Bertine 
Dear Chief, 
I shall await the dissent in the 
above. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
~rtnu ~rt Df tJ{t ~ittb .ttalt.e' 
llultiugton, ~. Of. 2llhi~~ 
December 4, 1986 
No. 85-889 Colorado v. Bertine 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. I may add a few thoughts by 
way of concurrence. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS or 
.JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 
.Jnprtmt Ql~tmt of tift ~ittb .Jtalt.e 
~ulfington. ~. Of. 21T~l!~ 
December 5, 1986 
Re: No. 85-889 - Colorado v. Bertine 
Dear Chief, 
I would be pleased to join your proposed opinion, but hope 
you will consider the following suggestions: 
Page 4, Line 20: 
Delete first sentence of first full paragraph and 
replace with: "By contrast, an inventory search may be 
"reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment even though it is not 
conducted pursuant to warrant based upon probable cause." 
Page 6, Line 3: 
Replace the first full paragraph with: "The Supreme 
Court of Colorado also expressed the view that the search in this 
case was unreasonable because Bertine's van was towed to a 
secure, lighted facility and because Bertine himself could have 
been offered the opportunity to make other arrangements for the 
safekeeping of his property. But the security of the storage 
facility does not completely eliminate the need for inventorying; 
the police may still wish to protect themselves or the owners of 
the lot against false claims of theft or dangerous 
instrumentalities. And while giving Bertine an opportunity to 
make alternate arrangements would undoubtedly have been possible, 
w ... 
Page 7, Line 17 
Replace second to last full paragraph with: "Bertine 
finally argues that the inventory search of his van was 
unconstitutional because departmental regulations gave the police 
officers discretion to choose between impounding his van and 
parking and locking it in a public parking place. The supreme 
Court of Colorado did not rely on this argument, and we reject 
it. Nothing in Opperman or LaFayette prohibits the exercise of 
police discretion; rather, those cases imply only that whatever 
discretion is exercised be based upon something other than 
suspicion of evidence of criminal activity. Here, the discretion 
afforded the Boulder police is exercised in light of two factors 
unrelated to suspicion of contraband: the proximity of public 
parking and the risk of damage or vandalism." 
The last of these in particular seems to me of great 
importance. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.llu.prtutt (lfourt d tlft 'Jnitt~ .fta.tt.e' 
'JU'lfiltgton. ~.Qt. 21lc?"~ 
December 8, 1986 
No. 85-889 Colorado v. Bertine 
Dear Chief, 
I have joined your q:>inion in this case and indicated 
I might add sarething by way of ooncurrence. Harry and Nino have 
each requested changes. Perhaps you can find a way to satisfy 
roth of their requests although they overlap in part. My purpose 
in writing you is to sa~ as one who has joined ~that I have no 
abjection to their requests. If you \'>tere to add sarething along 
the lines suggested by Harry cancerning standardized police 
procedures, I would see no need to write a separate concurrence. 
Sincerely, 
~ Chief Justice 
Copies to the Ccnference 
CHAMeERS 01" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u.prttttt <!fonri of tift ~b ,jtatts · 
Jlasftinghtn. ~. <If. 20p'l~ 
December 9, 1986 
Re: No. 85-889 Colorado v. Bertine 
Dear Harry and Nino, 
I have incorporated verbatim Nino's first and second 
changes proposed in his letter of December 5th, and combined 
what seems to me the substance of the third suggestion along 
with the secopd suggestion contained in Harry's letter of 
December 5th. I have adopted only part of the first of 
Harry's two suggestions because the part I don't want to 
adopt goes further than our cases go, or I would go, in 
confining inventory searches. I think these searches are 
properly confined by requiring standardized procedures and 
limiting discretion to factors which do not depend on 
suspicion of evidence of criminal activity. But I do not 
think that all discretion must or can be taken away from 
police officers when they conduct inventory searches, so 
long as a decision between impounding the van and parking 
and locking it in a public place is not based upon 
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Re: No. 85-889 - Colorado v. Bertine ~ 
Dear Chief, 
I appreciate your accommodations, and am pleased to 
join your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CH .. MBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.t'upum.t <lfqnri d tift ~nitt~ ~hrltS' 
Jfag.lfittghtn. ~. elf. 2Llfi'!' 
December 11, 1986 
Re: 85-889 - Colorado v. Bertine 
Dear Chief: 
Because I was troubled about this case, I 
decided to wait to see what is written in dissent 
before finally casting my vote. I must say, however, 
that I presently expect to join the opinion that you 
have circulated. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~mu <!fllltti dtlr~~b.itatte 
'Jlulfi:tt.gt.ou:.lJ. <!f. 2.llbi'!" 
Re: No. 85-889, Colorado v. Bertine 
Dear Chief: 
December 11, 1986 
I 
Although I am writing a brief separate concurrence, 
I join your opinion for the Court. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
.. } 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.in.prtmt Qionri of t4t lbtit.tb .jtatt.-
._.,.lfiugton. Jl. QI. 21lc?-'' 
December 19, 1986 
No. 85-889 Colorado v. Bertine 
Dear Harry, 
/ 
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December 20, 1986 
85-889 Colorado v. Bertine 
Dear Harry: 
Please add my name to your concurring opinion. 
Justice Blackmun 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
~, 1 r 
Sincerely, 
December 20, 1986 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Andy 
Re: Colorado v. Bertine, No. 85-889 
Justice Marshall's dissent has empha ized (effectively but 
imprudently, I think) that the police case had more 
discretion that the Court's opinion s gests. Because I think it 
--------··~-~
is important to re-affirm our commi menf to this part of the 
"inventory search" exception, I r commend that you join Justice 
Blackmun's concurring opinion. I note that Justice O'Connor 
your decision in Opperman, and also would preserve flexibility 
for later cases. 
CHAMI!IERS 0,. 
.JUSTICE WN . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
..iltpttmt Of~ttri of ffrt~b ..italt.tt 
:Jilu~ J. <If. 20~,., 
December 29, 1986 
No. 85-889 
Colorado v. Bertine 
Dear Thurgood, 






Copies to the Conference 
~uvunu OJo-ttrio-f tltt ~nittb ~hrltll' 
Jfaglfittghtn. ~. OJ. 2.0~J!..;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
December 29, 1986 
Re: 85-889 - Colorado v. Bertine 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
v 
~upunu <!fami af tJrt ~nit~ ~hrlt• 
JfagJrtttgfun. ~. <!f. 20.?'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
December 29, 1986 
Re: 85-889 - Colorado v. Bertine 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
-=rrs / '" 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
v 
85-889 Colorado v. Bertine (Andy) 
CJ for the Court 11/17/86 
1st draft 12/1/86 
2nd draft 12/4/86 
3rd draft 12/10/86 
4th draft 1/6/87 







1st draft 12/11/86 
2nd draft 12/30/86 
Joined by SOC 12/19/86 
LFP 12/20/86 
TM dissenting 
1st draft 12/18/86 
2nd draft 12/30/86 
Joined by WJB 12/29/86 
TM will dissent 12/1/86 
WJB awaiting dissent 12/2/86 
SOC may write a concurrence 12/4/86 
